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Interest on Business Checking Accounts?
On March 31, 1986, regulators lifted interest
rate ceilings on all personal deposit accounts
except "demand" deposit accounts. Payment of
interest on the latter, which are checking
accounts with deposits legally available "on
demand", continues to be prohibited by federal
law. From an individual's point of view, this pro-
hibition is immaterial because ofthe absence of
ceilings on another type of checking account-
the NOW (Negotiable Order of Withdrawal)
account - which, for all practical purposes, is a
perfect substitute for a demand deposit account.
In effect, then, banks now do not face any
restrictions on the interest they may pay on per-
sonal checking accounts.
One important interest rate ceiling, however,
remains - a flat prohibition against the payment
of interest on business checking accounts (i.e.,
demand deposits). Businesses currently are not
permitted to have NOW accounts, so tney can-
not avoid the interest ceiling on demand
deposits by switching to NOWs the way con-
sumers can.
Recently, two regulatory proposals have re-
ignited the controversy over whether depository
institutions should be allowed to pay interest on
business checking accounts. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) proposed
to give state-chartered banks that are not mem-
bers ofthe Federal ReserveSystem the authority
to offer NOW accounts to their business
customers. In addition, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (which regulates thrifts) proposed to
lift transaction restrictions on thrifts' money mar-
ket deposit accounts (which are currently avail-
able to businesses). This would have the effect of
removing interest ceilings on business checking
accounts held at thrifts. Although neither pro-
posal appears likely to go forward, this may be
" an opportune time to reconsider the merit of
prohibiting the payment of interest on business
checking accounts.
Some analysts argue that paying interest on busi-
ness checking accounts simply would raise the
costs of funds for banks (and thrifts) and depress
their profits. Others argue that the removal of
interest rate ceilings on business checking
accounts would enhance the efficiency ofthe
payments system, and might actually benefit
banks and thrifts as a whole by shifting funds
used for transaction purposes now held outside
the depository industry into banks and thrifts. In
this Letter, I discuss the merits ofthese
arguments.
Effects of ceilings
The conventional wisdom (as reported in the ....
popular press) seems to be that deposit rate ceil-
ings somehow eliminate competitionfor
deposits and thereby reduce the cost of attrac-
ting deposits. Some go as far as to argue that
banks get their business demand deposits for
free.
Proponents ofthis view apparently have
neglected the fact that banks have to compete
for deposits among one another and with non-
bank, short-term liquid investment alternatives
that are free of interest ceilings (such as Treasury
securities and money market mutual funds).
Thus, for a given bank to attract and hold
deposits, it must at least partially match the
returns available elsewhere.
Banks match the returns available elsewhere
through various forms of"nonprice" (i.e., non-
interest) competition. One common form of
nonprice competition is the "compensating bal-
ance" arrangement. Under such an arrange-
ment, banks offer various services below cost as
compensation to businesses for holding their
checking balances at banks. Thus, business
checking deposits hardly constitute a free source
offunds for banks.
Cash management in an unregulated world
In an interesting series of articles, economists
Fisher Black (1970, 1975) and Eugene Fama
(1980, 1983) have discussed what banking
would be like in a completely unregulated world
free of interest ceilings, reserve requirements
and portfolio restrictions. They argue that, in
principle, virtually all assets would be "check-
able" directly, with the only limitation being the
transaction costs involved in exchanging assets.FRBSF
Although technology and financial markets may
not have progressed to the point where it would
be economically sensible for all assets to be
checkable, the innovation of money market
funds, which enable investors to write checks
against various types of bonds, and "cash man-
agement" accounts at brokerage firms are but
short steps from the world envisioned by these
economists.
In such a completely unregulated world, banks
would act more like today's money funds or bro-
kerage houses. They would offer various types of
business checking accounts that pay market-
determined interest rates depending on the type
of underlying asset and whether the bank or the
depositor assumed the risk of changes in asset
values; and banks would charge the marginal
costs of actual transactions and·asset exchanges.
In such a world, there would be little incentive
for cash management as we now know it
(although there still would be portfolio manage-
ment) sincechecking account deposits would be
similar to other short-term liquid investments in
terms oftheir yield.
Our world, of course, is not free from regulation,
and considerable resources and an entire indus-
try appear to be devoted to circumventing reg-
ulatory restrictions on business checking
accounts. For example, many firms use over-
night repurchase agreements (repos) as a cash
management tool to earn, in effect,a market rate
of interesron funds being held for transaction
purposes. By holding only the funds needed for
one day's net transactions in their checking
accounts, huge volumes oftransactions can be
accomplished with very lowaverage account
baiances. Simi.lar arrangements are also used by
the checkable money funds: participants in
those funds hold checking accounts into which
funds are transferred only as checks are pre-
sented for payment. Thus, money fund holders
also can writevery large volumesof checkson
transaction balances that average close to zero.
Cash management activities in general are
largely aimed at minimizing the level of bal-
ances.in business checking accounts. One pri-
mary reason for cash management is the
prohibition of interest payments on transaction
accounts. If banks were free to pay market rates
of interest on checking accounts, there would be
little incentive to "sweep" these accounts daily
into repos, Treasury securities or other higher
yielding liquid investments. Instead, banks could
hold the Treasury securities themselves, and thus
allow depositors to avoid the daily transactions
costs in trading them.
However, even ifthe interest ceiling were elimi-
nated, reserve requirements would still limit the
interest banks could pay to a level somewhat
below market rates (currently about 88 percent
ofthe market rate). Thus, to eliminate incentives
for business cash management completely,
either reserve requirements would have to be
eliminated or interest paid on reserves. Doing
either would, in turn, raise monetary conttol
issues. Nevertheless, eliminating the ceiling
alone might go a long way toward eliminating
the incentive for many cash management
activities.
Cash management activities to minimize bal-
ances in checking accounts are productive from
the private beneficiary's point of view, but they
are pure waste from society's viewpoint to the
extent that they exist solely to circumvent reg-
ulations. (This is not tosay that firms would not
still have to manage their portfolios' liqUidity
and maturity in the absence of regulations.) Iron-
ically, the ceilings on business checking
accounts probably have been far more distor-
tionary (in terms of attracting significant amounts
of resources to circumvent them) th?n ceilings
on individual accounts. This is because the
much larger sums involved in a typical business
account make it more worthwhile for businesses
to try to evade interest ceilings.
Extent of cash management
The extent of thesesocially wasteful cash
management practices may be very large as
indicated by the amount oftrading in govern-
ment securities (Treasury bills, notes and bonds)
-one of the liquid investments that substitute
for business checking accounts. For the 36 pri-
mary governmentsecurities dealers alone, the
daily volume oftransactions is approximately
$70 billion - large enough that the entire stock
offederal debt turns over every month. Although
a large number ofthese transactions are
undoubtedly for normal investment purposes,
the turnover rate of the government securities
market is 25times greater than that ofthe stockmarket, suggesting that a large part ofthe gov-
ernment securities trading is for cash manage-
ment purposes.
Even more astounding are the demand deposit
turnover rates at major New York City banks
(where many major corporations hold checking
accounts). In 1984, the annual turnover rate at
those banks was 1,843 - or about 7 times per
business day. Although part ofthe high turnover
is probably due to normal financial and business
transactions, the very high level ofturnover sug-
gests that businesses are successful in keeping
average balances extremely low relative to the
amount of transactions. The annual turnover rate
for all demand deposits (including consumer
accounts) was an almost equally astonishing 434
- or almost twice a business day. The turnover
rates of zero-interest checking accounts contrast
sharply with those of consumer NOW accounts.
The latter has an annual turnover rate of approx-
imately 16 - about thirty times lower than the
rate on all zero-interest demand deposits.
While a relatively large volume of business
transactions undoubtedly are undertaken for the
normal exchange of goods, services and finan-
cial assets, extremely large volumes and rapid
turnover suggest that a large part ofthe observed
transactions are for cash management purposes
- to circumvent the interest ceilings and reserve
requirements on demand deposits. Although
each transaction may not be very costly in abso-
lute terms, the total cost of these needless trans-
actions might be high because the total annual
volume of transactions for cash management
purposes could easily be many times the gross
national product.
Removing the ceilings
If the prohibition against paying interest on
demand deposits were removed, there might be
a large reduction in the amount of wasteful cash
management. There is, however, a debate about
whether the large number of transactions in the
government securities market, the existence of
the overnight repo market, the very large volume
of wire transfers, and the extremely high turn-
over of demand deposits are due primarily to the
restriction on interest payments or to reserve
requirements.
Some argue that compensating balance.arrange-
ments enable banks to circumvent the interest
ceiling almost perfectly and costlessly. Others
argue that inefficiencies are involved in non-
price competition because at least some deposi-
tors value the services they receive at less than
their cost.
Even if this latter argument were wrong and the
interest ceiling on business checking accounts
were being largely circumvented, eliminating
the interest ceiling would simply result in some
substitution of explicit interest for the implicit
interest currently paid through compensating
balance arrangements. And this would have no
important effects on banks or the economy.
If compensating balance arrangements were not
perfect substitutes for explicit interest payments,
the removal of the ceilings would result in a
reduction ofwasteful cash management
activities and indirect methods of compensation.
Although the interest costs on demand deposits
would rise, banks' total net costs (associated
with demand deposits) would be largely
unaffected in the long-run as underpriced ser-
vices were eliminated. Moreover, banks likely
would increase explicit fees for transactions.
This too would lead to a reduction in socially
wasteful transactions.
Increased fee income and reduced expenditures
on providing non-priced services would, at least
in the long-run, offset the increase in the explicit
interest costs of demand deposits. Moreover, the
degree of financial intermediation services
provided by banks would increase. Although
traders in government securities (which includes
some large banks) and managers and owners of
some ofthe money funds might suffer losses, the
economy as a whole would benefit.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)








Change from 4/1 0/85
Dollar Percent?
Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 201 ,519 - 845 11,256 5.9
Loans and Leases1 6 182,979 - 908 10,681 6.1
Commercial and Industrial 52,590 - 610 - 257 - 0.4
Real estate 66,571 9 3,823 6.0
Loans to Individuals 38,846 - 83 5,481 16.4
Leases 5,655 31 292 5.4
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 10,662 62 - 377 - 3.4
Other Securities2 7,878 1 951 13.7
Total Deposits 203,668 -1,529 6,508 3.3
Demand Deposits 49,852 -1,666 3,276 7.0
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 34,690 217 4,409 14.5
OtherTransaction Balances4 16,492 243 2,336 16.5
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 137,324 - 106 897 0.6
Money Market Deposit
Accounts-Total 46,476 80 2,419 5.4
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 37,069 - 132 - 1,680 - 4.3
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 25,647 -1,703 5,349 26.3
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
7 Annualized percent change